gaps bring forth. Transference therefore relies on imaginary constructions that reduce or transform otherness by giving it a familiar shape. Such constructions may range from highly creative and empathic apprehensions of the other to projective identification, and to foreclosure or paranoid rejection of difference. The imaginary fashioning of others, including cultural others, according to one's own frame of reference and organisation of affect may thus reduce anxieties that emerge in the face of otherness more generally. But often such imaginary operations entail projections of fear, hostile impulses or even illicit desires and come therefore at the high price of distortion and misrecognition, not only of the other, but also of oneself and one's own role in the encounter.
In intercultural encounters more specifically, transference is stimulated by the mutual unfamiliarity with the other's cultural codes and rules of communicative behaviour as well as the other's culture of emotions. Transference is, in fact, the very process that grounds what we have come to call the 'cultural imaginary' or the 'cultural unconscious'. The gaps in cultural competence and knowledge and the indeterminacy of performative interactions function analogously to what Freud envisioned as the 'empty screen' in the psychoanalytic situation that facilitates projection. We know, of course, that neither in interpersonal nor in intercultural encounters will we ever find a truly 'empty screen'. We rather encounter a fuzzy screen replete with gaps and hieroglyphic encodings of unfamiliar signs. Strangers to each other, the protagonists try to read the hieroglyphs, each according to their own cultural codes in an attempt to fill those gaps with projections based on their own personal and cultural knowledge. The ensuing projective dynamic can be understood as a transference both because it activates interiorised patterns of cultural contact that have become habitual or unconscious and because it inevitably entails an imaginary element. The role of the imaginary is, of course, highly ambivalent in that it may facilitate access to the other or foreclose it by ignoring, denying or resisting difference. There is, of course, also a conscious or unconscious struggle for power at work that concerns the question of which culture will ultimately prevail in providing the framework and values of the interaction.
As the "Writing Lesson" illustrates, fieldwork situations are intensely cathected by the psychic energies of both the anthropologist and the indigenous
The Writing Lesson • 57 people and therefore constitute hotbeds of intercultural transference. Let me briefly recall what Lévi-Strauss highlights as the 'extraordinary incident' that turned into the writing lesson. The scenes that immediately precede and follow the writing lesson are, in fact, a stunning, highly self-ironical travesty in which the anthropologist exposes himself as a culturally illiterate dupe among the alphabetically illiterate indigenous tribe. Lévi-Strauss' hilarious report on his expedition with his Utiarity friends into the rainforest borders on slapstick comedy. The anthropologist had arranged this enterprise to perform a gift exchange with the Tarunde who are, like the Utiarity, a subgroup of the Nambikwara. Despite Lévi-Strauss' choice of a slightly self-ironical comic tone, his narration barely conceals his strong fear during the event that, at times, borders on paranoia.
The story begins when Lévi-Strauss virtually coerces the chief of the Utiarity to assist him in this expedition to the Tarunde, despite the fact that the two tribal groups had been living in a rather precarious balance. Reluctantly, the chief finally complies after limiting the expedition to four oxen for carrying the presents. Immediately after their departure for the journey, which Lévi-Strauss retrospectively calls a 'grotesque interlude', his Brazilian companion notices the absence of women and children. "In travel books, such circumstances mean that an attack is imminent," 4 writes Lévi-Strauss, thus exhibiting his cultural illiteracy in his utter reliance on the extrinsic literary knowledge of travel books, that is, his own culture's imaginary construction of indigenous cultures and cultural encounters with the New World. Lévi-Strauss continues the trip in utter apprehension; yet as soon as they catch up with the rest of the group he is forced to acknowledge that, nourished by imaginary tales found in travel narratives rather than by actual experiences with the Nambikwara, his fears were groundless. It is, in fact, fear that induces the anthropologist to relinquish his actual experience of the other culture in favour of a projection drawn from his own cultural imaginary. Continuing the expedition, the Indians however lose their way, fail to provide food, and generate widespread discontent against the chief whom they hold responsible for complying with the anthropologist's request. Moreover, at the appointed meeting place, it becomes evident to Lévi-Strauss that the chief had coerced the Tarunde to come against their will.
Aware of the 'dangerous situation', Lévi-Strauss proposes the very giftexchange that generates the writing lesson. Knowing that the Nambikwara had not developed alphabetic writing technologies, he chooses as his first gift to the tribe a stack of paper and pencils, encouraging the people to write.
To his delight, they fill their pages with minute wavy lines, careful imitations, if not abstractions, of the linear sequence of signs they know from the anthropologist's own notations. In retrospect, Lévi-Strauss reads this event as the 'advent of writing' among the oral tribe. In a sense, he already inscribes the 'prehistory' of writing within a teleological model of progress when he sets out to play this trick with his indigenous objects of study. It is, after all, designed to demonstrate his superior authority as an owner of what for the tribe is a new technology, namely alphabetic writing.
The "Writing Lesson" culminates in Lévi-Strauss' transactions with the tribe's chief. In the process of the gift exchange, the chief asks the anthropologist for a writing pad and uses it dramatically to change his role as prime native informant. Whenever Lévi-Strauss henceforth asks him for information, the chief, in response, takes his writing pad and begins to write. With a polite smile, he then hands Lévi-Strauss a sheet of paper filled with carefully drawn and perfectly regular wavy lines. Lévi-Strauss interprets this exchange as the effect of a hierarchical distribution of the power derived from the possession of writing. The chief, he argues, understands this power and uses it to gain authority over his tribe:
No doubt he [the chief] was the only one who had grasped the purpose of writing. So he asked me for a writing pad, and when we both had one, and were working together, if I asked for information on a given point, he did not supply it verbally but drew wavy lines on his paper and presented them to me, as if I could read his reply. He was half taken in by his own makebelieve; each time he completed a line, he examined it anxiously as if expecting the meaning to leap from the page, and the same look of disappointment came over his face. But he never admitted this, and there was a tacit understanding between us to the effect that his unintelligible scribbling had a meaning which I pretended to decipher; his verbal commentary followed almost at once, relieving me of the need to ask for explanations.
As soon as he had got the company together, he took from a basket a piece of paper covered with wavy lines and made a show of reading it, pretending to hesitate as he checked on it the list of objects I was to give in exchange Fiorini points out that the paper the chief feigned to read could have been perceived as a mere prop in a performance, or as a sign that the chief carried out a tacit agreement between him and the foreigner. 12 One could however also argue that the chief uses writing as a pictograph of sorts -understood here in the minimal sense of a performative language game that uses geometrical signs in order to communicate via indirection, play, and artifice. The chief would then have used writing as a medium of indirect communication that transcends literal meaning, using irony and pastiche as a source of pleasurable refinement. We might also consider the 'wavy horizontal lines' as literary in Roland Barthes' sense of a discourse in which the word or the form leads the idea. 13 The knowledge the chief conveys in a quasi-literary or aesthetic mode, however, is only accessible to someone willing to enter the chief's language game and able to understand it in its function as the performative enactment of a different kind of information. We could transcribe the latter's effect of 'talking back' as follows: "No, I will not comply. This is your medium of power and I will not let you use it to assert your superiority but turn it against you." Lévi-Strauss misses such a reading because he assumes that the chief utilises writing only as the object of a mimetic staging of roles, performing a pure simulation of signs. Therefore he fails to perceive the chief's particular use of writing, its irony and its role in a performative language game the meaning of which is conveyed via indirection and resides in its metacommunicative effect.
If we thus read the chief's simulation of writing as a performative enactment, the hierarchical distribution of power takes indeed a different turn from the one emphasised by Lévi-Strauss. Using the paper as a space of mimetic play, the chief turns the expected cultural self-representation that he is supposed to perform as a native informant into a performance about cultural otherness and contact, as well as intercultural communication. He thus performs a language game that contains a lesson that is less about the 'advent of writing' in the oral culture of the Nambikwara than about the 'advent of literature' Given the broad notion of writing, literature and the imaginary on which the above reading relies, a further elaboration of the use of these terms seems in order. If we look more closely at the exchange between the chief and the anthropologist, we notice that the chief performs much more than a simple imitation of writing. Ultimately at stake is that Lévi-Strauss and the chief display a radically different sense of simulation or, more to the point, mimesis.
For Lévi-Strauss, mimesis is the imitation of an action -a relatively narrow notion that is already centred in a rather reductive definition of writing. For the chief, mimesis is performative and dynamic, engaging in a complex cultural exchange that produces difference rather than similarity. He thus foregrounds the gaps of knowledge between the players as well as the attempt wanted to astonish his companions, to convince them that he was acting as an intermediary agent for the exchange of the goods, that he was in alliance with the white man and shared his secrets." 16 The sharing of gifts has expanded to include a sharing of secrets. However, the sharing of secrets is not as mutual as it might look on the surface. As Lévi-Strauss would have it, the chief pretends that he shares the anthropologist's secret of writing. To those lacking the competence of alphabetic writing, the letters on the page appear as hieroglyphs that bear a secret. The secret allegedly shared between Lévi-Strauss and the chief, however, is the latter's ignorance of the secret of writing. Could it be that the chief also shares a secret with the tribe? Could they simply play along in the chief's scheme in the same way as Lévi-Strauss does, fully aware of the fact that the chief plays a game of 'giving by withholding' and perhaps even pretending that they are able to understand the meaning of the hieroglyphs that escaped the anthropologist? In that case, they too would share a tacit knowledge with the chief who, in turn, would skilfully play a double game of cultural negotiation. The very possibility of such a complex cultural negotiation never occurs to Lévi-Strauss, nor, for that matter, Derrida.
In Marvelous Possessions, 17 Stephen Greenblatt explores the rhetoric of the marvellous that sustains the narratives of European encounters with the New World. Interestingly, Lévi-Strauss casts himself as the one who brings marvels to this world and the marvels he brings are precisely the 'marvels of writing'. "We were eager to be off," he says in yet another abrupt turn of his Apart from serving as props in the chief's performative enactment, the empty graphs also operate like a projective screen that invites imaginary inscriptions. We witness a negotiation that demonstrates how the deciphering of cultures and their texts is informed and permeated by the fantasies of the people who inhabit, produce or read them. Concrete information is embedded in a performative politics and aesthetics of cultural contact that we must learn to read before we can begin to decipher the information.
In sharpening our vision for such a different mode of deciphering, the aes- We may finally draw a more general conclusion from these observations. My reading of the "Writing Lesson" suggests that, in order to understand intercultural encounters and modalities of cultural contact, we need a theoretical model able to account for the complex performances of intercultural transference that enter any exchange or translation between cultures. Cultural negotiations inevitably draw on the cultural imaginary and the cultural unconscious. In order to understand this interplay we need cultural politics and psychology as well as cultural rhetorics and poetics. Poetic, artistic or performative exchanges establish a tacit meta-or sub-text that not only reveals imaginary or unconscious investments in the other culture, but also plays across the boundaries of the official rules and codes of the exchange, often counteracting its presupposed hierarchies. 
Notes

